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THE LAW CLERK'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Preserving the confidentiality of judges' work has been "an
honored tradition among law clerks." 1 Former clerks, especially
those of United States Supreme Court Justices, have occasionally
published reminiscences of their court experiences,2 but "none of
these [publications] has gone to details of particular cases or to work
habits and attitudes of justices as they relate to other justices." 1
This traditional secrecy recently was shattered by the publication of
The Brethren4 and by the testimony of law clerks before a televised
California judicial conduct investigation. 5 The authors of The
Brethren asserted that 170 former law clerks were among their
anonymous sources and that "dozens of sources" handed over con-
ference notes, diaries, unpublished opinion drafts, and internal
memoranda between Justices.0 The California incident was less
I Wright, Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26
VAND. L. 11Ev. 1179, 1189 n.38 (1973). See W.O. DOUGLAS, TnE COURT YEARS:
1939-1975, at 174 (1980) ("In the long years I served, there was never any
suspicion that a clerk violated a confidence of the Court."). But cf. Newland,
Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REv.
299, 310 (1961) (reporting a United States Supreme Court law clerk's 1919 leak
of a forthcoming opinion to stock market dealers as the only leak leading to legal
action against a Court clerk); B. WOODWARD & S. AamsM-ONC, Tim BREThmEN
237-38, 150 (1979) (a law clerk provided background to Time magazine regard-
ing a forthcoming decision; law clerks who played basketball with the Solicitor
General's staff leaked decision dates).
2 See, e.g., Boskey, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, 59 HIv. L. Rlv. 1200 (1946);
Meador, Justice Black and His Law Clerks, 15 ALA. L. REv. 57 (1962); Williston,
Horace Gray, 1828-1902, in 8 GnAT AmmcAN LAWyERS 139 (W. Lewis ed.
1909).
3 Frank, The Supreme Court: The Muckrakers Return, 66 A.B.A.J. 161, 163
(1980).
4B. WOODWARD & S. ARtmSTRONo, supra note 1.
5 Ordinarily such investigations in California are held in private, but a modi-
fication of the rule was obtained in this case. The public nature of the proceed-
ings was successfully challenged by California Supreme Court Justice Mosk and
declared violative of the California constitution. Mosk v. Superior Ct. of Los
Angeles County, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979) (en
banc).
6 B. WooDWARD & S. AnmSTRONG, supra note 1, at 3-4. It seems clear that
at least some clerks breached confidentiality, because former law clerks were major
sources and the book "is based almost entirely on material and information that
can, with some degree of accuracy, be considered to have been confidential before
its publication there." Bender, Book Review (Tun BREnmmN), 128 U. PA. L.
REv. 716, 721 (1980); accord, Symposium, The Brethren: Yea or Nay, 15 U. PA.
L. ALuNm J., Summer 1980, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Symposium] ("There is
very little room for disagreement . . . that a great number of people broke con-
fidences and provided information without restrictions.") (remarks of Professor
Burbank). It should be noted, however, that not all of the 170 former clerks who
were interviewed revealed confidential information. See Fletcher, Book Review
(ThE BREThmEN), 68 CALIF. L. 1Ev. 168, 169 n.5 (1980) (author knows a number
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voluntary: a state judicial conduct commission subpoenaed law
clerks to testify in a public investigation of alleged misconduct by
California Supreme Court justices.7 Two justices instructed their
clerks not to testify, but the staffs of the other justices cooperated
and reported conversations with justices that clearly took place on
the assumption of confidentiality.8
The breaches of confidentiality involved in The Brethren and
the California investigation have caused concern among judges "
and commentators.' 0 Some have argued that such leaks will have
an adverse impact on the judge-clerk relationship." Others, dis-
agreeing generally with the secrecy surrounding the inner workings
of the judiciary, have argued that such disclosures should be en-
couraged.12 Still others have expressed mixed emotions about the
propriety of the disclosures.'
3
The law clerk's confidentiality duty, and the information to
which the duty extends, are not well-defined.' 4 Because of the rela-
of clerks who talked but revealed no confidential information and mentions one
outraged clerk who wrote to Newsweek magazine stating that he had answered
only "general questions about the court").
7 Abramson, Should a Clerk Ever Reveal Confidential Information?, 63 JurDCA-
turx 361 (1980). The investigation concerned the alleged delay in announcing
controversial decisions until after the retention election of four California Supreme
Court justices, among them Chief Justice Bird. Tesitor, Calif. Commission Won't
File Charges in Probe of Supreme Court, 63 JuncAruRn 296 (1980). The investi-
gation ended without any charges being filed. Abramson, supra, at 361 n.2.
SAbramson, supra note 7, at 361. In view of the nature of the allegations,
testimony presumably was taken concerning the handling of and discussions about
the controversial cases.
9 See Henry, Book Review (THE BRnsmmN), 47 TENN. L. REv. 495, 498-99
(1980). Several judges responding to the survey conducted for this Comment also
expressed their disapproval. See note 15 infra & accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Kurland, Book Review (THE BREMTEN), 47 U. CAL L. REv. 185,
193 (1979) ("The Brethren likely will bring no shame to any except those who
provided the offal that was packaged in this volume."); Tribe, Trying California's
judges on Television: Open Government or Judicial Intimidation?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1175,
1178 (1979) ("Nobody can seriously doubt that judges would be unable to perform
their delicate mission of assuring equal justice under law if their thought processes
and confidential deliberations could be subjected routinely to public gaze and
official censure."); Breach of Court Secrecy Angers Former Clerks, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
17, 1979, at 17.
11 See, e.g., Daniels, Book Review (THE BxuRrsmm_), 44 Ar. L. Rnv. 732,
737 (1980); Kurland, supra note 10, at 193; Lewis, Book Review (THE BEznmEN),
52 N.Y. ST. B.J. 205, 211 (1980); Steinberg, Book Review (THE Bnmumi), 66
A.B.A.J. 186, 188 (1980).
12 See, e.g., B. WoonwARD & S. AnmsTONG, supra note 1, at 1; Miller &
Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for Piercing the Red Velour
Curtain, 22 BuFFALo L. REv. 799 (1973).
13 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 6, at 725; Symposium, supra note 6, at 16
(remarks of Professor Burbank).
14 See Symposium, supra note 6, at 16 ("These responsibilities [of a law clerk]
... have not been well-defined.") (remarks of Professor Burbank).
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tive paucity of research concerning these issues, a survey of the
practices and opinions of a nationwide sample of federal and state
judges was conducted to supplement other source material.15 This
Comment discusses the conclusions that may be drawn from analysis
of the survey results and other available information. Part I ex-
amines the nature of the judge-clerk relationship and current prac-
tices concerning clerk confidentiality. Part II discusses the nonlegal
rationales for and against confidentiality. Part III analyzes the legal
and ethical bases for a confidentiality duty on the part of law clerks.
Part IV then proposes guidelines for specific aspects of the law
clerk's confidentiality duty and a method for enforcing the pro-
posed guidelines.
I. THE JUDGE-CLERK RELATIONSHIP AND CURRENT
CONFIDENTIALITY PRACTICES
The judge-clerk relationship is multifaceted and has been de-
scribed as including teacher-pupil, employer-employee, and lawyer-
lawyer relationships.'6 The clerk also may serve as a confidant or
friend, adding a personal component to the relationship.17 The
teacher-pupil 18 and lawyer-lawyer aspects are revealed by the inter-
changes between judges and clerks. On the one hand, law clerks
15A copy of the postal questionnaire and a discussion of the sample is con-
tained in the Appendix infra. Survey recipients were assured that the presentation
of findings would not permit the identification of individual courts or judges. Sur-
vey results are on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review office.
16 A. DiLEo & A. RuBLN, LAW CLEPR HANDBooK 39 (1977).
17 Clerks' reminiscences often describe the development of warm personal rela-
tionships with their judges. See, e.g., Chief Justice Vinson and His Law Clerks,
49 Nw. U. L. REv. 26 (1954); McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46
COLUm. L. REv. 710 (1946). Several survey respondents also described their
relationships with clerks as "close" or "open." The employment of multiple clerks
per judge, however, is likely to dilute these close relationships. See Symposium,
supra note 6, at 17 ("The result [of the increasing number of clerks per chambers]
is that the simple personal relationship is far more distant than it used to be.")
(remarks of Professor Burbank).
18 justice Cray of the Supreme Court, for example, apparently "treated the
law clerk much as a law professor would treat a student, exploring the clerk's views
and only implicitly revealing his own." Oakley & Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges"
Eyes: Tradition and Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67
CALIF. L. Rv. 1286, 1289 (1979). One federal district court judge's outline of
the duties of his law clerks includes the discussion of cases under advisement. He
describes the process as follows:
I like for my clerks to question my preliminary judgment and to suggest
their own ideas for my consideration. While . . . my primary interest
must be the work product of the clerk and its assistance to me in the
judicial process, I think the period of clerkship should be a significant
experience for the clerk and should serve to broaden his own background
and abilities.
A. DrLEo & A. RumN, supra note 16, at 11-12.
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are short on experience and seek to gain an operational view of the
judicial decisionmaking process. 19 On the other hand, many judges
value clerks straight from law school precisely because recent grad-
uates have been exposed to the latest doctrinal developments and
usually have a fresh viewpoint.20 Communications between judge
and clerk about cases and opinions not only serve the educational
interests of the clerk but also present an opportunity for the judge
to test, refine, and clarify ideas.
21
The use of law clerks by judges has grown enormously since
the inception of the practice.22  The "traditional" law clerk-the
short-term recent law school graduate assigned to a particular judge
29 Abramson, supra note 7, at 361 (The clerkship is a "valued interlude be-
tween law school and lawyering, a cap on one's legal education by way of example
set by the judge as tutor."); Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26
VAm. L. REv. 1125, 1161-62 (1973); P. Barnett, Law Clerks in the United States
Courts and State Appellate Courts 4 (Nov. 1973) (Am. Jud. Soc'y Research Study).
2 0 See Baler, supra note 19, at 1141; ABA Comama. o N ST NARDS OF JuDiciAL
ADmN TRATiON, STADARs RELATNG To APPELLATE CoUrTs 97-98 (1977).
Justice Douglas was opposed to Chief Justice Burger's experiments with per-
manent clerks because of his preference for "fresh minds." He noted:
Under [a permanent clerk] system the law clerks would acquire more and
more power, with no fresh minds coming in annually to ventilate the old
stuffy chambers; under such a system the ideas of the "boss," usually
stuffy and stereotyped, would never be challenged. That movement would
mean the end of the seasoning of the pudding-it would eliminate the
spice that fresh young minds [bring] to the job.
W.O. DounAs, supra note 1, at 175.
2lBraden, The Value of Law Clerks, 24 Miss. L.J. 295, 296 (1953) ("Dis-
cussion of a case serves to clarify a man's thoughts, and a clerk can be of great
value to a judge by asking pointed questions, posing alternatives, and generally
acting as a devil's advocate.").
One appellate judge has described the benefits of conferring with his clerks
as follows:
[Tihe judge will often find it profitable to confer at length with his
clerk. In order to test his tentative conclusions, the judge may require the
clerk to defend the opposing position or the judge himself may reverse
roles, attacking his own opinions. The interchange is often quite beneficial
to the judge, enabling him to look at an issue from an entirely different
angle. . . . [T]hese conferences . . . will often help the judge to under-
stand better his own position....
Wright, supra note 1, at 1187-88 (footnote omitted).
22 The practice began in 1875 with Horace Gray, then Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court. Justice Gray continued this practice when he was
appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1882. Oaldey & Thompson,
supra note 18, at 1289-90. Since that time the institution has multiplied so that
law clerks now serve on all federal court levels, all but six of the highest state
appellate courts, and all but three intermediate state appellate courts. P. Barnett,
.supra note 19, at 1. Moreover, there has been a trend toward having more than
one clerk per judge or justice. Since 1970, the United States Supreme Court
Justices have had at least three clerks, and federal courts of appeals judges have
had at least two; since 1965, federal district judges have had the option of having
a second law clerk in lieu of a court crier. Oaldey & Thompson, supra note 18,
at 1291. The Supreme Court of California in 1976 employed thirty-three "research
attorneys" for seven justices. Id. 1302.
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-is still the predominant mode, although some jurisdictions employ
a "central staff" unassigned to particular judges 23 or "career clerks"
who have indefinite tenure.
24
The law clerk's general function "is to participate in processing
effectively and fairly the litigation assigned." 25 The specific duties
of the law clerk vary with the court and the particular judge
served,26 but may include research, drafting, editing, cite checking,
proof reading, document assembly, conference attendance, reading
and indexing slip opinions, errands, library maintenance, and dis-
cussions with the judge. 27 Judges generally prepare findings of fact
or opinions, then ask their clerks to review them and to check or
2 3 Because of indications that a justice's productivity was not increased sig-
nificantly by the addition of extra law clerks to his personal staff, the Michigan
Court of Appeals initiated the use of "central staff" as a response to increasing
caseloads. Lesinski & Stockmeyer, Prehearing Research and Screening in the
Michigan Court of Appeals: One Court's Method for Increasing judicial Productivity,
26 V.AND. L. REv. 1211, 1213-14 (1973).
24 The use of career clerks to the virtual exclusion of traditional short-term
clerks is "apparently unique to California." Oakley & Thompson, supra note 18,
at 1294.
25 A. DiLEo & A. Rusnn, supra note 16, at 4. An annotated bibliography of
materials dealing with the role and experiences of Supreme Court clerks may be
found in Garcia, The Role and Experiences of Supreme Court Law Clerks: An
Annotated Bibliography, 70 L. LiB. J. 338 (1977).
26 Barnett, supra note 19, at 3. Justice Douglas noted some variations of law
clerk use by Supreme Court Justices:
Holmes . . .took a clerk largely as a companion. Brandeis used a clerk
as researcher for the voluminous footnotes often found in his opinions.
Stone would dictate his opinions, and when he stated a principle of law
he would say in parentheses "Cite cases." The draft would go to the
clerk, who would then look for the cases supporting Stone's position....
Justice Murphy .. .relied heavily on [his law clerk] in preparing the
first draft of his opinions for the Court....
I used my law clerks primarily to certify the accuracy of my opinions
as to facts and precedents. . . . The law clerk would write a memo-
randum on each petition for certiorari and on each jurisdictional statement,
but I went over each case independently of him .... [A]t times I asked
him to draft a concurring or dissenting opinion for me, which I in turn
would revise or rewrite.
W.O. DoucI.As, supra note 1, at 171-72. Courts that use some clerks as part of a
"central staff" usually assign specific functions to that group. For example, the
Michigan Court of Appeals uses its central division to research and screen appeals
prior to hearing. Lesinski & Stockmeyer, supra note 23, at 1213.
27 A. DiLEo & A. Runsn, supra note 16, at 3, 12-16. Trial court clerks tend
to have more contact with attorneys, witnesses, fact-finding and discovery; appellate
court clerks' primary activities are research and drafting. Id. 5-6. Judge Henry
Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has described
his use of law clerks as primarily for cases "where it is apparent that a fair
amount of added research will be needed before I can come to any conclusion."
H. Friendly, How a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals Works (1962)
(New York, Institute of Judicial Administration), quoted in Wright, supra note 1,
at 1189-90.
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add citations. Clerks also may be asked to draft findings or
opinions.
28
Because of their position, clerks have a unique view of their
judges and other court personnel. They also have access to opinion
drafts, internal memoranda, and information gleaned from discus-
sions with judges, none of which are made public once a decision
is reached. Prior to announcement of a decision, the clerk may
have information concerning the scheduling of a case and its prob-
able or certain outcome. Clerks who develop close personal rela-
tionships with their judges also may be aware of the judges' political
philosophies or personal feelings about particular lawyers, litigants,
other judges, or cases.
Despite the clerk's access to confidential material and the con-
cern provoked by the perceived impropriety of particular disclosures
by law clerks, 9 there exists no uniform code of professional respon-
sibility for law clerks.30 For example, a variety of answers has been
offered by commentators considering the question to whom a clerk
may speak concerning past and present cases. Answers vary from
the permissive to the restrictive: allowing communication between
clerks and spouses,31 limiting discussion to the "court family," 32
using discretion within the court,s and prohibiting speaking out-
side the individual chambers.
8 4
28 A. DrLEo & A. RuBIx, supra note 16, at 12.
29 See notes 9-11 supra & accompanying text.
30 Adoption of a code of conduct for law clerks is being considered by the
Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. ADzImnsTnATrvE OFICE OF TnE UNrTED STATEs CouRTs, REPORT oF THE
PRocEmNos or Tim JunrcrAL CoNFERENCE OF T=E UN=FEr STATEs 82 (Sept. 24-25,
1980). Arguably the Code of Judicial Conduct applies to certain behavior by
clerks via their judges' authority over them. See text accompanying notes 107-08
infra.
31 See Baier, supra note 19, at 1145 n.88 ("Justice Tate was of the view that
so long as the confidential nature of the discussion is understood by both parties,
there is nothing wrong with an exchange of ideas between clerks about cases cur-
rently pending . . . or with an after-offce dialogue between husband and wife,
often unavoidable anyway.").
3 2 See Wright, supra note 1, at 1189 n.38 ("What matters is that the judge's
work product must be kept exclusively within the court's family; it should not be
shared even with the family of the clerk."); Hamley, Sample Instructions to Law
Clerks, 26 VArN. L. REv. 1241, 1242 (1973) ("You may, unless instructed other-
wise by your judge, discuss court cases with other law clerks, provided you cannot
be overheard by others not connected with the court. But do not discuss undecided
cases with your wife or anyone else outside the court.").
3 3 See Aldisert Duties of Law Clerks, 26 VAsm. L. Rv. 1251, 1256 (1973)
("[A]lways be very discreet in your discussions with law clerks or other judges....
[I]t is improper to convey personal impressions of these chambers to other
chmbers.").
34 See Baer, supra note 19, at 1143 n.82 (noting justice Brandeis's instructions
to his clerk, Louis Jaffe: "He once told me that I was never to let anyone know
vat we were working on, not even the secretaries of the other Justices.").
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Individual judges or courts generally have forged their own
policies that vary considerably in content, specificity, and formality.
The survey revealed that an oral instruction about confidentiality
at the beginning of a clerk's tenure is the most common practice.35
Some jurisdictions have local court rules concerning the release of
information by court personnel, but these usually are limited to
information about pending cases.36 Some courts and judges provide
manuals for their clerks' use; the manuals vary in content and
specificity.37 The survey also revealed that a few judges require a
written agreement or oath promising confidentiality by their clerks88
while some judges provide no instructions to their clerks.
II. THE CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUE
A. The Importance of Preserving Confidentiality
The necessity for frank and open communication in an atmos-
phere of trust is the reason most frequently given by commentators
and judges for preserving the confidentiality of the inner workings
of the judiciary. Breaches of confidentiality, it is argued, will result
in curtailment of open discussion that will, in turn, impair effec-
tive functioning of both judge and clerk and damage their relation-
ship.
3 9
35 Ninety-four percent of the survey sample reported using oral instructions.
36 A typical rule provides that "[a]ll courthouse personnel, including . .. Law
Clerks . . . are prohibited from disclosing to any person, without authorization
from the Court, information relating to any pending civil or criminal case that is
not part of the public records of the Court." M.D. LA. R. 24. Some rules are
limited to pending criminal matters. See, e.g., E.D. LA. R. 13.8.
37 About half of the survey respondents reported using manuals, often in con-
junction with oral instructions. A handbook used by some federal judges provides
that "everything that occurs in the process of decisionmaking and all statements
or events that do not occur in open court or in open conference with attorneys
present" are within the clerk's confidentiality duty. A. D.LEo & A. RoBiN, supra
note 16, at 41. This handbook, although published by the Federal Judicial Center,
expresses the views of its authors and has no official status. 'Each judge will have
his own approach, and will wish law clerks to handle problems in the manner
considered most appropriate." Id. Foreword. One court's manual, provided by a
survey respondent, indicates that clerks have the responsibility to preserve "pro-
fessional confidences." It specifies that revelations concerning pending matters
such as "the names of cases in which memoranda or dispositions are being pre-
pared, the weights of particular cases, or the names of the judges assigned to cases
not yet argued or submitted" is prohibited. General information about staff func-
tions may be discussed, but internal memoranda are confidential "both during the
pendency of the case and after decision by the court."
38 Nine percent reported using an oath or a written agreement or both. See
note 102 infra & accompanying text.
39 See notes 16-21 supra & accompanying text for a discussion of the nature
of the typical working relationship between judge and clerk. The opportunity for
a judge to test and clarify ideas and the ability of the clerk to assist in the decision-
making process would be impaired if discussion were markedly limited.
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Our survey findings strongly support this argument. Respond-
ing judges frequently mentioned the necessity of preserving free
and open communications between judges and clerks as a basis for a
clerk's confidentiality duty.40 One judge, for example, articulated
this concern as follows:
My relationship with my law clerks is a close and con-
fidential one. If I cannot speak freely to them, they can-
not do their job for me. And I could not speak freely
to them if I thought that my questions, soul-searching, and
opinions would be made matters of public record or pri-
vate conversation. There is often a good deal of give and
take and what finally emerges may not have been anyone's
original thought. If my half-formed ideas or preliminary
thoughts are not kept confidential by my law clerks-then
I will have to keep them confidential myself and that will
seriously impair the decision-making process.
Judges were asked how a breach of confidentiality by a law
clerk might affect their relationships with other clerks-for example,
by limiting the range or type of discussion or by influencing their
preference for permanent clerks.41 Only thirty percent of the re-
sponding judges felt there would be no impact. Slightly over half
felt there would be or had been a negative impact on the closeness
of the relationship or on the range and type of discussions with
clerks.4 Topics specified by some judges as candidates for ex-
4 0 These responses were in answer to questions 1 and 4(f) of the survey. See
Appendix infra, for text of these questions.
41 See question 7, Appendix infra, for precise wording of the question used.
One of the predicted effects of the leaks involved in The Brethren was a negative
impact on the judge-clerk relationship because of more circumscribed discussion
or less intimacy. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 11, at 737; Grossman, Book Review
(THE BRETMREN), 1980 Wis. L. REv. 429, 439; Kurland, supra note 10, at 193;
Lewis, supra note 11, at 211; and Steinberg, supra note 11, at 188.
42 judges' estimates of the strength of the impact varied. Typical strong state-
ments are illustrated by the following two comments:
A Judge will be a fool only once. If a single law clerk reveals things
about a judge's methods, habits, speech (expletives, for example), reliance
on briefs, law clerks, overuse of law reviews, etc., the Judge will simply
have an arm's length relationship of great formality so all a law clerk sees
is what the public sees. They will not be very useful after that.
I believe a breach of confidence would make the work of future law
clerks less interesting, less rewarding, and less effective because I would
clam up and tell them a whole lot less than I tell them now when I treat
them like lawyers and trust them. Without trust, I'd probably find a good
lexis operator and forget about law clerks.
Another judge, however, was more ambivalent about the impact of leaks on
discussion:
This is difficult to answer since I desire to have as open a relationship as
possible with my law clerks-this is helpful to me as well as to the law
1981] 1237
1238 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 129:1230
purgation if a breach of confidentiality was considered likely in-
cluded court votes, court attitudes, the judge's own votes and atti-
tudes, opinions about the effect of another judge's political
philosophy on his or her decision in a particular case, anger about
another judge's views, and the effect of a colleague's views on the
structure of an opinion.
The comments of some survey respondents who reported that
they or their courts had experienced a breach of confidentiality
by a law clerk 48 demonstrates the reality of the negative impact
of leaks. One judge replied: "Yes-definitely-[a breach] always
does [affect discussions]. You keep such vital information to those
with a need to know. I do not let law clerks take outside calls on
pending cases." Other judges, desiring to maintain a fruitful work-
ing or personal relationship, use a cautious but less drastic approach:
"I tend to be more guarded in my confidences with my new clerks
until I'm satisfied they are honorable," "[a breach] always inhibits
my relationship with my present clerks, makes me more inhibited,
at least temporarily," and "[a]ny fear of continuous breaches would
make my life miserable, for I would have to further retreat into
privacy."
The concern of many judges was demonstrated by their em-
phasis on the need for clearer policies regarding confidentiality,
whether effectuated informally through selection and training pro-
cedures or formally through mechanisms such as oaths and written
agreements. Almost two-thirds of the survey respondents express-
ing an opinion on the issue indicated that a breach of confidenti-
ality would prompt them to take more care in selecting and
orienting their clerks. Approximately one-third stated that their
reaction would be to adopt a formal policy, such as requiring clerks
to take an oath or to sign a written agreement.44
clerk. I suspect a breach of confidentiality would make me more cautious
and [might] limit discussions with my law clerks.
43 Eighteen percent of the respondents fell into this category. Judges were
asked if they or their courts had experienced any incidents that they considered
breaches of confidentiality. See Appendix infra, question 6, for precise wording.
"Breach of confidentiality" purposely was not defined. This approach turned out
to be justified in light of varying opinions of the scope of the duty expressed by
survey respondents.
44 Comments typifying the formal approach included the following: "Any
breach (other than an inadvertent one . . .) would cause me to insist to my col-
leagues that we adopt a formal, written policy re confidentiality and require our
clerks to sign an oath of confidentiality"; "It would make me rethink my practice
of not requiring a specific agreement of confidentiality," and "It might suggest
use of a 'Snepp' type contract, or if egregious enough a court rule or statute."
See text accompanying notes 104-10 infra for discussion of Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
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Finally, seventeen percent of the survey respondents said that
a breach would affect their preference for hiring permanent clerks.
Some reported that a change to permanent staff would be a "last
resort." Others felt that permanent clerks may become an attrac-
tive alternative, especially if the confidentiality problem is perceived
as chronic. For example, one judge who has experienced con-
fidentiality breaches stated:
I have considered permanent clerks on occasion for this
and other reasons but have decided against it because the
confidentiality problem has not been severe. . . I gain
greatly from the interest and enthusiasm of bright, new
graduates of law schools and I am as yet unwilling to de-
prive myself of that pleasure. If the problem should be-
come severe, I might reconsider.
A second argument for preserving confidentiality is the need to
protect judges' independent reasoning from outside influences.
45
One proponent of this view suggests that "we need courts inde-
pendent enough to serve as 'safe asylums' in times of crisis. They
cannot do so if threatened with mind probes whenever they render
judgments out of tune with popular sentiment." -6 Without con-
fidentiality, judges "will fear . . . the candid and vigorous internal
disagreements without which the judicial process would be rendered
vastly less thoughtful and ultimately less effective." 47 Former
Chief Justice Earl Warren similarly argued that the process be-
tween argument and the announcement of a decision "is, of neces-
sity, confidential. . . . Throughout the decision-making process,
members of the Court are left to their own consciences in the quiet
of their chambers to reflect on the facts and the applicable law,
except for any discussion they might have with their colleagues on
the merits of their cases." 48
Preserving public confidence in the judiciary is a third reason
for maintaining the confidentiality of a court's deliberations. Several
survey respondents emphasized this theme. For example, one judge
commented that a "court does consider factors which should ulti-
mately be and are discarded as meritless. Public display of such
considerations in retrospect would afford ground for ridicule."
Another judge felt that "good procedure" requires that the judge's
45 See, e.g., Miller & Sastri, supra note 12, at 817; Tribe, supra note 10, at
1178.
46 Tribe, supra note 10, at 1177.
47 Id. 1178.
48E. WAmm-, THu MFIoIIs oF EAru, W~mux 337 (1977).
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opinion "stand as the rationale of the case, without a clerk's prog-
nostications." Similarly, commentators have argued that although a
court's opinion may be the result of compromise, the opinion
should stand alone because "it is the compromise that is relevant
to the legal profession and the public; and the fact that some
[judges] may have harbored a no-compromise position or that the
original draft of the Court's opinion was more forceful is only of
incidental concern to the legal analysts and historians." 49
Protecting litigants and others who might be affected by a de-
cision is a fourth reason for maintaining confidentiality.5 0 Al-
though some commentators argue that all court deliberations
should be open,51 an overwhelming majority of judges and com-
mentators agree 52 that preserving the confidentiality of delibera-
tions in pending cases is necessary to prevent one party from gaining
an unfair advantage or an outside person from exploiting advance
knowledge of a decision.
5 3
Protecting a judge's reputation 54 and legitimate privacy inter-
ests is an additional reason supporting confidentiality. For example,
several commentators on The Brethren were distressed by the
revelation of incidents such as the details of Justice Douglas's last
illness and Justice Stewart's personal reasons for not being interested
in becoming Chief Justice.5 5 Judicial inquiry and disciplinary
practices in forty-seven states reflect this concern. Their pro-
49 Gressman, Irreverent Questions About Piercing the Red Velour Curtain, 22
BuFFA o L. REv. 825, 829 (1973) ("[Tlhe Court's opinion writers generally and
accurately incorporate the significant suggestions of their colleagues,"). See also
E. WAmREN, supra note 48, at 282.
50 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 9, at 499 ("[Tlhe ultimate rights of litigants
may only be protected when judges may explore the issues, adjust their thinking,
and formulate decisions without fear of attendant publicity."). Even the authors
of The Brethren did not interview clerks for the three year period preceding pub-
lication "[to ensure that [their] inquiry would in no way interfere with the ongoing
work of the Court .... " B. WooDwARn & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 2.
51 See notes 59-64 infra & accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 6, at 721; Henry, supra note 9, at 499. For a
discussion of law clerk confidentiality in pending cases, see notes 137-49 infra and
accompanying text. All survey respondents indicated that the confidentiality duty
extends to information about pending cases.
53 The 1919 leak case, for example, involved the exploitation of advance in-
formation about decisions to speculate in the stock market. P. Barnett, supra note
19, at 1. See note 1 supra.
54 Cf. Mosk v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 491,
601 P.2d 1030, 1041, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 505 (1979) (en banc) (confidentiality
of judicial investigations and hearings "protects judges from injury which might
result from publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints").
55 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 9, at 496; Navasky, Book Review (Tim
BRETHim), 89 YALE L.J. 1028, 1030 (1980).
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cedures provide for confidentiality at least until a formal complaint
is filed with the supreme court or equivalent body.""
Related to privacy and reputation interests of judges and public
confidence in the judiciary is the perceived need to guard against
inaccuracies in, and distortions of, law clerks' disclosures. One of
the strongest criticisms of The Brethren, for example, is that the
law clerk's perspective is limited or distorted. 7 Additionally, there
is concern that disclosures will be distorted by those seeking the
information, especially journalists58 Several survey respondents
voiced these concerns. One said that information about judges
"often involves an unfounded assumption that the clerk's opinions
are necessarily objective and unaffected by his own personal views
or personal relationship with the judge. Whatever the case, the
judge is in no position to reply, even if the comment is false or
unjustified." Another noted that "[a]s The Brethren has shown,
personal or judicial comments made by judges to their clerks can
be misquoted, distorted, or so taken out of context that they have
no value except to undermine the public's confidence in the
judiciary."
B. Rationales for Limiting Confidentiality
Several rationales have been advanced that support limiting
the confidentiality of the inner workings of the courts. First, courts
are political institutions, deciding general governmental policies in
such sensitive areas as segregation, abortion, and capital punish-
ment.59 "[B]asic democratic theory," requiring "knowledge not
only of who governs but of how policy decisions are made," thus
requires that the courts' decisionmaking processes be open to the
public and subject to informed criticism. 0
56Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 834 (1978).
57It has been suggested that law clerks are one-sided and nonobjective
sources. See, e.g., Aynes, Book Review (TnE BRETH uN), 13 AERoN L. BEV. 507,
513 (1980); Goldberg, A Former Justice on 'The Brethren, NAeT'L L.J., Jan. 21,
1980, at 14. Moreover, it has been argued that law clerks lack firsthand knowl-
edge of many things--for example, judges' conference deliberations. See, e.g.,
Daniels, supra note 11, at 733-34; Goldberg, supra, at 14.
5 8An example of a distortion potentially damaging to reputation in The
Brethren is the allegation that Justice Brennan voted against his conscience in a
criminal case in order to curry favor with another Justice. See B. WooDwAlm & S.
AsRmSToNc, supra note 1, at 225. An independent investigation of the clerks em-
ployed during the period in question revealed that they all denied reporting or
knowledge of such an incident. Lewis, supra note 11, at 205-07.
5 9 Abramson, supra note 7, at 402. See also Kurland, supra note 10, at 195.
60 Miller & Sastri, supra note 12, at 799 (emphasis in original); See also id. 822.
If deliberations were publicly held, there would be little to keep confidential. The
desirability or effectiveness of open deliberations, however, is questionable. See,
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A second rationale focuses on the public need to know how
decisions are made in order to use the judicial system effectively
and, where judges are elected, to make informed voting decisions.61
This rationale calls for some exploration of the inner workings of
the courts0 2 It no longer seems open to doubt that judges' decisions
are based partially on their values and preferences.0 3 If judicial
processes are surrounded by secrecy, the public is deprived of in-
formation that may be helpful in evaluating judges and the judicial
system.6
Finally, wrongdoing or impropriety on the part of the judi-
ciay 0 5 should justify a breach of the normal confidentiality of judi-
cial deliberations.00 Limiting the confidentiality of court processes
will facilitate discovery and correction of wrongdoing because law
clerks will be more likely to disclose any knowledge of such conduct
if they do not fear breaching a confidentiality duty.
e.g., Gressman, supra note 49, at 826 (open deliberations could either destroy
"valuable interplay of individual viewpoints" or force judges to "retreat to more
private techniques of decision making"); Grossman, Comments on "Secrecy and
the Supreme Court", 22 BuFFALo L. REv. 831, 835 (1973) (an openness more
"apparent than real" might be the result); Howard, Comment on Secrecy and the
Supreme Court, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 837, 839 (1973) (private deliberations pre-
vent premature judgments). The proper scope of, and forum for, such criticism
also is debatable. See notes 167-70 infra & accompanying text. Nevertheless, the
idea of judicial Immunity from all external scrutiny is antithetical to the judiciary's
"political" function in a democratic society.
61 Abramson, supra note 7, at 403.
62 This was the basic premise underlying The Brethren, B. WOODWAno & S.
AumSmoNG, supra note 1, at 1. Other commentators have argued that the public
has an interest in the deliberate processes of a policymaking body such as the
Supreme Court. Some disagreement over the frequency and timing of such ex-
ploration has been expressed. Compare Bender, supra note 6, at 724 (might dis-
approve if exploration occurred in the present and on a daily basis) with Miller &
Sastri, supra note 12, at 799 (recommending open deliberations).
63 "Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and im-
portance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious
judgment, it Is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding."
O.W. HOL~mS, The Path of the Law, in Co~r_ cvx LEGAL P.APas 181 (1920).
It may not be feasible to assess the impact of these unarticulated values. See
Gressman, supra note 49, at 826. The internal procedures of a court are dis-
tinguishable from the unarticulated values of judges, however, because such pro-
cedures are susceptible of apprehension.
04 Survey respondents provided little support for the right-to-know rationales,
although a few judges noted the people's or history's right to know "certain
matters."
65 See note 182 infra.
66 Several commentators on The Brethren hinted they might have been less
critical of the exercise if judicial wrongdoing or abuse of power had been involved.
See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 10, at 190; Lewis, supra note 11, at 212. See notes
182-92 infra & accompanying text for discussion of the wrongdoing exception to
the confidentiality duty.
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III. BAsES OF A LAw CLERK's CONFIDENTIALITY DUTY
The legal and ethical bases of a law clerk's confidentiality duty
can be viewed on at least four levels-an informal moral obligation,
7
an articulated but nonbinding professional responsibility,6 a bind-
ing fiduciary or contractual obligation, 9 and a formal duty imposed
by court rule or statute.70 Survey respondents 71 mentioned each of
these bases as follows: fiduciary duty (sixty-three percent); Code of
Professional Responsibility (fifty-one percent); moral or "other"
(thirty-one percent); contract (twenty-two percent), and court rule or
statute (twenty-three percent).
Such a diversity of bases thought to underpin the confidentiality
duty helps to explain the undefined content and scope of a law
clerk's responsibility 72 and the differing reactions to disclosures
made by former Supreme Court clerks to the authors of The
Brethren.73 The varying bases also may reflect the varying practices
used by different courts. For example, some jurisdictions have
relevant court rules or statutes while others do not; some jurisdic-
tions hire clerks who are already members of the bar, a practice
that could affect the applicability of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Judges requiring written agreements may be more
likely to believe there is a contractual basis to the duty.
A. Moral Obligation
A law clerk's moral obligation to preserve confidentiality arises
from the loyalty and trustworthiness inherent in the nature of the
clerkship.74 Survey respondents who checked "other" as a basis of
confidentiality mentioned many of the rationales supporting confi-
dentiality,75 but particularly emphasized the clerk's personal loyalty
to the judge and to the court. Fifteen percent of the respondents
specified no additional legal or professional ethical bases, indicating
a belief that the law clerk's confidentiality duty is exclusively rooted
in moral grounds.
67 See notes 74-82 infra & accompanying text.
68 See notes 83-99 infra & accompanying text.
69 See notes 100-15 infra & accompanying text
7o See note 36 supra, note 152 infra, and text accompanying note 116 infra.
71 See question 4 of Appendix infra for wording of question. Many re-
spondents indicated more than one basis.
72 See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
73 See notes 9-13 supra & accompanying text.
74 See notes 16-21 and 25-28 supra & accompanying text.
75 See notes 40-58 supra & accompanying text.
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There is a social expectation that relationships characterized
by intimacy and friendship, such as that between judge and clerk,76
call for loyalty and trustworthiness.7 7  Many judges consider their
clerks extensions of themselves; a breach of confidence, therefore,
may be regarded as a personal betrayal.7s Comments of some survey
respondents show that their expectation of loyalty is based on the
personal nature of the judge-clerk relationship: "The working re-
lationship between judge and clerk is intimate and dependent, and
the judge should not have to be on guard for fear that a spur of the
moment comment or an expression of a confidence will be made
public" and "[m]utual confidence is essential to the relationship
which should be and remain essentially personal as between clerk
and judge, as if the clerk were a part of or extension of the judge."
Loyalty to a judge and to the court thus would prevent a clerk
from revealing anything said in confidence that might undermine
the judge's or the court's functioning or reputation. Both personal
and institutional loyalty, however, rest on an individual clerk's
conscience, discretion, and judgment. The only sanctions are a
guilty conscience, disapproval, discharge, or a potentially negative
impact on future employment opportunities if a breach is publi-
cized. Loyalty is therefore an unreliable and unpredictable pro-
tector of confidentiality. Individuals may differ in their definitions
of detrimental information.79 Personality or philosophical conflicts
between clerk and judge may result in a lowered sense of personal
loyalty by the clerk.80 Furthermore, the dilution of the personal
judge-clerk relationship attendant on the practice of employing
multiple clerks per judge 81 and the use of "central staff" 82 similarly
may lead to a dilution of the clerk's sense of loyalty.
76 See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
77 See Henry, supra note 9, at 499 ("It is imperative that an appellate judge
have the complete loyalty and confidence of his or her clerk."). Cf. Breach of
Court Secrecy Angers Former Clerks, supra note 10, at 17 (one former clerk
termed revelations by his colleagues as "a complete breach of faith").
78 Some survey respondents who reported that they had experienced a breach
f confidence described their reaction as one of anger, disappointment, or hurt.
79 For example, some clerks were willing to reveal a great deal and others
,only spoke of "general" matters to the authors of The Brethren. See note 6 supra.
Cf. Breach of Court Secrecy Angers Former Clerks, supra note 10, at 17 (some
former clerks reportedly were outraged at the revelations of some of their former
colleagues).
80 This difficulty may be overcome partially by careful selection of candidates;
several survey respondents mentioned more careful screening as a desirable pro-
tective mechanism.
82 See notes 17 & 22 supra; Bender, supra note 6, at 724 n.48.




Two codes of professional conduct-the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct 83 and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility s4-
arguably serve as bases for a law clerk's confidentiality duty, either
by implication or by analogy. The Code of Judicial Conduct di-
rectly applies only to judges, but "it serves as a model for standards
of conduct required of all employees and officials of the judicial
branch." 15 Moreover, Canon 3B(2) of the Code provides that "[a]
judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and dili-
gence that apply to him." 86 By implication or through the judge's
role as employer, therefore, a law clerk may be subject to this code. 7
For purposes of defining the clerk's confidentiality duty, how-
ever, the Code of Judicial Conduct is limited. It requires that the
judge, as employer, exercise control and supervision over the clerk;
it makes the clerk responsible to his or her employer for "fidelity
and diligence" rather than to any external standard. Whatever
the scope of confidentiality, a uniform external standard providing
direct guidance to law clerks seems more likely to encourage clerks
to maintain confidentiality s8 than the indirect standard provided
by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Code of Professional Responsibility could be used as a
basis for the clerk's confidentiality duty by analogizing the clerk-
judge relationship to the attorney-client relationship 89 and arguing
that a clerk owes his or her judge the same duty of confidentiality
that the attorney owes his or her client.90 Two problems arise,
83 The Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted by the Judicial Conference
of the United States as the standard for all federal judges except Supreme Court
Justices and by forty-three states as of January 1978. Thode, The Code of Judicial
Conduct-The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 395, 395.
84 The Code of Professional Responsibility has been adopted in all fifty states,
usually with minor variations, as the standard of conduct for lawyers admitted to
the bar. Armstrong, Codes of Professional Responsibility, in PRoFEssIoNAL BE-
spoNsmr.Ty: A Gu= FOR ATros mys 1, 4 (1978).
85 A. DI.Eo & A. RI rN, supra note 16, at 26.
86 ABA CODE OF JUDIcIAL Co-zDUCr Canon 3B(2).
87 The survey revealed that some clerks specifically promise to conduct them-
selves in accordance with the Code of Judicial Conduct.
88 This is the rationale, for example, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
See text accompanying note 99 infra.
s9 See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 33, at 1256; Hanfley, supra note 32, at 1241.
Some survey respondents also characterized the clerk-judge relationship in this
manner.
9o See ABA Cons OF PRoFEssioNAL REPsoNsmrTY Disciplinary Rule 4-101.
iThe Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Re-
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however, from a direct application of the attorney's duty to the
law clerk. First, many clerks are not members of the bar during
their clerkships and therefore would not be bound by the Code.
Second, even for those clerks who are members of the bar, it is
unclear whether the judge can be considered a "client" of the
clerk, because the traditional clerk assigned to a particular judge
is employed to assist that judge in performing a public function
rather than to represent his or her personal interests.
The clerk's professional role seems more akin to that of the
government lawyer 9 ' than to that of an attorney representing a
private client. Opinion 73-1 92 of the Federal Bar Association de-
scribes the difference between the private and the government
attorney:
[The government] lawyer assumes a public trust... [and]
is responsible to the people in our democracy with its
representative form of government .... In contrast, the
private practitioner represents the client's personal or pri-
vate interest.... [W]e do not suggest, however, that the
public is the client as the client concept is usually under-
stood. It is to say that the [government] lawyer's employ-
ment requires him to observe in the performance of his
professional responsibility the public interest sought to be
served by the governmental organization of which he is a
part.93
Thus, although the public is not a client as that term is tradi-
tionally understood, the government attorney has a public respon-
sibility. The client, "using the term in the sense of where lies
[the government lawyer's] immediate professional obligation and
responsibility," is identified as "the agency where he is employed,
including those charged with its administration insofar as they are
engaged in the conduct of the public business." 04 Furthermore,
sponsibility are hereinafter cited, respectively, as ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsFoNsiBIrr EC and ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmnzrTy DR.]
91 The federal government lawyer works for the military, the legislative branch,
or an executive agency. Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional
Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J. 1541, 1541 (1974).
9 2 FEa. B. A. Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICs, OPINIONS, No. 73-1 (1973),
reprinted in 32 FED. B.J. 71 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Opinions 73-1].
The difficulty identifying the client of the federal government lawyer was one
of the considerations that prompted the Federal Bar Association to adopt, in Novem-
ber 1973, the Federal Ethical Considerations to supplement the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Poirier, supra note 91, at 1541.




"[t]he relationship is a confidential one, an attribute of the lawyer's
profession which accompanies him in his government service. This
confidential relationship is usually essential to the decision-making
process ...... 95
If applied to the law clerk, this notion of responsibility would
require the clerk to serve the "public interest" by assisting the
judge in carrying out the court's judicial functions rather than the
judge's personal or private interest. The client, in the sense of the
clerk's "immediate professional responsibility," would be the court
and those in charge of its administration-presumably including the
judges-"insofar as they are engaged in the conduct of the public
business." The relationship as so defined would be a "confidential
one." Thus limited, the duty imposed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly . . .
[r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client." 06 This obligation
"continues after the termination of his employment," 17 and ex-
tends to refusing employment that "might require such dis-
closure." 98
A professional responsibility basis for a law clerk's confidential-
ity duty would provide a clearer and more uniform specification of
the conduct expected of clerks both during and after their clerk-
ships. Some survey respondents, for example, reported that breaches
of confidentiality by clerks often were inadvertent or resulted from
lack of awareness. These breaches and anonymous ones such as
those involved in The Brethren might be avoided if there were a
clearer sense that appropriate professional conduct bars such dis-
closures. Professional disciplinary sanctions such as denial of ad-
mission to the bar, disbarment, suspension, or reprimand could be
employed in egregious cases, but the primary benefit of a profes-
sional conduct rule for law clerks would be prophylactic. As one
commentator has observed:
95 Id. 72-73. Cf. ABA CoMM. ON EVALuATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNoucr Rule 1.12 (Working Draft, February 6,
1981) [hereinafter cited as MoDE. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT]. Currently
in the drafting and revision stage, these proposed rules treat lawyers employed by
a governmental agency as representing the organization rather than management
or other employees of the agency. The commentary to the rules notes that "[w]hen
the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate
between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful official act is
prevented or rectified, for public business is involved." Id. Comment.
96ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(1). Cf. MODEL
RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6, supra note 95 (eliminates the con-
fidences and secrets definitions and includes all "information gained in or relating
to representation of the client.").
97 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIrIiT EC 4-6.
98 Id. EC 4-5.
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While disciplinary bodies can deal with flagrant vio-
lators of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
ultimate enforcer of proper professional conduct is the
conscience of the bar and the ethical standards of its in-
dividual members. Adherence to the overall spirit of the
Code is ensured by the desire of lawyers to gain and main-
tain the respect of their fellow lawyers .... 99
C. Fiduciary or Contractual Duty
As an employee, a law clerk may have a common law "fiduciary
obligation to protect confidential information obtained during the
course of his employment." 100 This duty not to use or disclose
confidential information for personal gain would continue after
termination of employment. 101 A clerk also may be subject to
a contractual duty to preserve confidentiality if he or she is re-
quired to sign a written agreement or to take an oath that includes
such a promise. Nine percent of the survey respondents reported
using such an oath or agreement, although the promises required
vary in specificity and duration of the obligation.'0 2  Sixty-three
percent of the respondents mentioned fiduciary duty as a basis of
99 Armstrong, supra note 84, at 18.
100 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 n.11 (1980) (per curiam)
(dictum). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§395 & 396(b)
(1958).
101 RESTATEmENT (SEcoNm) OF AcENCY §396(b) (1958).
102 Judges were requested to provide a copy of any instructions regarding
confidentiality given to their clerks: A typical nonspecific instruction states: "All
your working relations and information acquired in the course of service are highly
confidential in character and must be treated and guarded by you on this footing."
A more specific confidentiality duty is established by the following instructions,
although the reference to "employees" leaves open the question of duration:
Employees shall not reveal to any person not a Court officer or employee:
(A) The Court's deliberations, discussion or other work product
concerning decisions,
(B) The identity of a Judge assigned primary responsibility for a
pending decision,
(C) the author of an opinion signed only by the Court, or
(D) Any other information or document which by the Court's local
rules is confidential.
An oath that is specific about the continuing nature of the confidentiality duty
provides:
I will maintain undivided loyalty to this Court and the judges thereof
and, both during and after my term of service, I will keep their trust and
preserve inviolate the confidences which they repose in me. I will not
divulge any conversations or information regarding the business of the
Court, or memoranda, or other writings, or disclose unannounced deci-
sions of the Court, or keep any documents or other papers without the
permission of this Court.
CONFIDENTIALITY DUTY
the clerk's confidentiality duty; approximately twenty-two percent
also indicated a contractual basis.
The duty of a former employee having access to confidential
information normally involves commercial or technical trade se-
crets. 10 3 In Snepp v. United States,104 however, the doctrine was
applied to a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee,
Frank Snepp, who had access to sensitive classified information
and published a book in violation of a secrecy agreement with the
CIA. The agreement forbade the disclosure of "'any classified
information'" and required CIA approval prior to the publication
of "'any information or material relating to the Agency, its ac-
tivities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after' "
employment.105 Despite this agreement, Snepp published a book
without prior clearance. The United States did not contend that
the book contained any classified information; 106 nevertheless, the
Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that Snepp had
breached his contractual and fiduciary obligations. 0 7 The lower
court's imposition of a constructive trust on the book's profits in
favor of the CIA thus was approved as a proper remedy.,08 The
Court relied on the "extremely high degree of trust" involved in
the employment and the language of the agreement that explicitly
recognized this trust. 09 Moreover, the Court stated that the "na-
ture of Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources
and materials could establish a trust relationship" even in the
absence of a written agreement." 0
103 Ricketson, Confidential Information-A New Proprietary Interest? Part 1,
11 MELBouNE U. L. REv. 223 (1977).
104444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
1051 Id. 508 (quoting the agreement).
108 Id. 511.
1071d. 516. Snepp's violation of his trust did not depend on whether the
book contained classified information. His failure to submit the book for review,
in light of the secrecy agreement and the trust reposed in him as an intelligence
employee, was sufficient to find a violation. The Court found that publication
of uureviewed unclassified material might harm Snepp's employer by exposing
classified information or confidential sources or by affecting some foreign govern-
ments' willingness to cooperate with the CIA. Id. 511-13.
108 Id. 515-16. See generally lEsTATEmENT (SEcoNn) oF AGENCY § 396(c)
(1958).
109 444 U.S. at 510.
110Id. 511 n.6 (dictum). The majority believed the constructive trust doc-
trine covered more than disclosures of classified information. Id. 515 n.11.
Snepp's defense of prior restraint of his first amendment rights was summarily re-
jected in a footnote-the Court stated that the secrecy agreement was an "'en-
tirely appropriate! exercise of the CIA Director's statutory mandate to 'protec[t]
12491981]
1250 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
To the extent that the position of the law clerk is viewed as
one of great trust, a useful analogy to Snepp can be drawn. A
written agreement would result in a clear contractual duty to pre-
serve confidentiality. Even absent a signed agreement, however,
the confidential nature of the clerkship 11 seems sufficient to invoke
the common law fiduciary obligation of present and former clerks
to preserve confidentiality," 2 especially if specific oral or written
instructions are given at the beginning of the clerkship."13
A cause of action based on a breach of the clerk's contractual
or fiduciary obligations thus could be maintained against present or
former law clerks disclosing confidential communications or docu-
ments. The potential remedies in such actions, however, make
them unsatisfactory methods of protecting the confidentiality of the
inner workings of the courts. Damages for breach of contract prob-
ably would be nominal because of the unquantifiable nature of the
injury. 14 An injunction against future breaches usually would
come too late. Imposing a constructive trust would be useful only
in situations where the clerk's unlawful disclosure was made for
profit. None of these remedies would be applicable in a case where
the identity of the one disclosing confidential information is un-
known, as in The Brethren.115 The only likely salutary effect of
requiring written or oral agreements, therefore, is a greater aware-
ness of the solemnity and content of the confidentiality duty.
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.'- Id. 509 n.3
(quoting the Court of Appeals and 50 U.S.C. § 403 (d) (3) (1976) ).
111 See text following note 17 supra. Federal law clerks are classified as
"confidential employees." ABA Comm. ON STANDARDS OF JUDIcI.AL ADMINISmTA-
TION, STAN)ARDs BELATING To CoURT ORGANIZATION § 1.42(b)(iii) (1974).
1 2The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, upholding
the validity of another CIA secrecy agreement, noted the needs of the various
branches of government for secrecy and quoted with approval the statement that
"'[t]he courts, too, often insist on the confidentiality of deliberations ... in judicial
chambers. The most confidential proceeding in all of government is probably
the conference of the Justices of the Supreme Court."' United States v. Mar-
chetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972)
(quoting Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. Rlv. 271, 274 (1971)).
113 See note 102 supra for examples of law clerk instruction currently used
by judges.
114 The Court in Snepp, for example, noted that the actual damages involved
in Snepp's breach were unquantifiable and that nominal damages would be an
ineffective deterrent. 444 U.S. at 514.
15 B. WoonwAD & S. ARmsThONG, supra note 1, at 3.
Even when the identity of the individual breaching confidentiality is unknown,
however, the injured party might have a cause of action in tort against the party
who induced the breach of contract. See W. PRossER, HA-nBOOr. OF ThE LAw
OF ToRTs § 129 (4th ed. 1971).
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D. Duty Imposed By Court Rule
Some jurisdictions have local court rules governing disclosures
by court personnel, including law clerks-"" These rules are limited
as a basis for the clerk's confidentiality duty, however, because they
generally apply only to pending cases, and because the limitation to
"court personnel" excludes former personnel. Given the brevity of
most clerkships, these court rules may protect information concern-
ing pending cases, but they are an insufficient basis for the totality
of a clerk's confidentiality duty.
IV. PROPOSED CONFIDENTIALITY GUIDELINES
In light of the multifaceted nature of the law clerk's position,
17
the arguments for and against preserving confidentiality,1 8 and the
varying bases of the clerk's confidentiality duty,"1 9 no simple rule of
nondisclosure is likely to resolve the confidentiality issue. Instead,
a set of guidelines is needed, varying in scope and required enforce-
ment according to the type of information involved. This Com-
ment proposes guidelines to govern law clerks' conduct when they
are asked to disclose information concerning pending cases, °20 past
cases,' 21 general decisionmaking practices of the court, 22 the philoso-
phy or personal traits of judges,u s or suspected or known wrong-
doing involving judges or other court personnel. 24 These proposed
guidelines specify the minimum content of the law clerk's confi-
dentiality duty that should be included in a mandatory professional
conduct rule, above-the-minimum content that should be part of an
"aspirational" guideline,1as discretionary content that should vary
with the instruction of the individual judge or court, and informa-
tion that is not part of the duty.
116 See note 36 supra and note 152 infra.
117 See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 39-66 supra.
119 See text accompanying notes 67-116 supra.
' 2 0 See text accompanying notes 137-49 infra.
121 See text accompanying notes 150-60 infra.
-
122 See text accompanying notes 161-70 infra.
12 3 See text accompanying notes 171-81 infra.
124 See text accompanying notes 182-92 infra.
125 An "aspirational" guideline would be similar to the ethical considerations
in the Code of Professional Responsibility that "represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive." ABA CODE OF PROFEssroNAL
RsPo NsmzrTY, Preliminary Statement. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
do not separate rules from ethical considerations. Some rules, however, are "im-
peratives"; others "define areas in which the lawyer has professional discretion."
MoDEL Ru Fs OF PoFEsSioNAL CoNmucT, supra note 95, at 4.
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The minimum and "aspirational" content of the confidentiality
duty should be incorporated in a code of professional conduct
specifically applicable to current and former law clerks. The pri-
mary benefit of such a code would be prophylactic, but disciplinary
sanctions also would be available for egregious breaches involving
the minimum mandatory content.126 To promote uniformity, the
American Bar Association should adopt the proposed guidelines and
encourage their adoption by state and federal courts.127 Adding the
law clerk guidelines to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, for ex-
ample, would be an efficient method of enforcing the minimum
mandatory content of the duty.
The brevity of many clerkships makes essential a procedure
that will reach former as well as current clerks. Current clerks
could be covered by existing judicial disciplinary machinery en-
forcing the Code of Judicial Conduct, 28 court rules, 1 29 and private
sanctions by their employers.130 Former clerks could be covered by
the existing lawyer disciplinary procedures enforcing the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility. 13' Standards recently adopted by
the American Bar Association for lawyer discipline make violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct a ground for discipline under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.132 Former judges resuming
their lawyer status may be disciplined under these standards even if
their misconduct occurred while they were judges. 33 Similarly, a
former clerk's past or present violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct could be made a ground for lawyer discipline. The sanc-
'
2 8 See text following note 98 supra and text accompanying note 99 supra.
127 The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Code of Judi-
cial Conduct were adopted first by the American Bar Association, then by most of
the states. Armstrong, supra note 84, at 4; Thode, supra note 83, at 395.
128 Each jurisdiction adopting the Code must establish its own disciplinary
procedures and penalties. Thode, supra note 83, at 396. Sanctions for violating
the Code have included private or public censure and removal from office. Id.
400-13. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Court has "inherent power . . . to protect the con-
fidentiality of its internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be
required").
129 See text accompanying note 116 supra.
130 See text accompanying note 114 supra.
131 Disciplinary procedures for lawyers vary widely among states. Armstrong,
supra note 84, at 17. Current procedures and enforcement have been subject to
heavy criticism. See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL Comms. oN EvALUATION OF DrSCPLnaWRY
ENFORCEMEr (1970). The American Bar Association recently has adopted new
standards for disciplinary proceedings, however, that may lead to improvement and
greater uniformity in this area. ABA STANDnRs FOR LAwYER DISCPLINE AND
DISABmnrY PrOCEEUGs (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDAms].
132 ABA STA Arts § 5.1(d), supra note 131.
133 Id. § 4.5.
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tions 14 imposed for a violation should be based upon the facts and
circumstances of the case and the purpose of lawyer discipline Is,_
"to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers
who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or
are likely to be unable to properly discharge their professional
duties." 136
A. Pending Cases
Guideline: A law clerk should never disclose [outside the court
family] information concerning the assignment, scheduling, internal
deliberations, or outcomes of pending cases that is not in the public
record.13
7
Commentators 13 8 and judges 13 9 agree that information con-
cerning pending cases should be within the scope of the law clerk's
confidentiality duty. Survey respondents unanimously included
such information in the clerk's duty. Moreover, thirty percent of
the respondents indicated that current clerks have a higher duty of
confidentiality than former clerks precisely because the potential
harms of a breach are greater in a pending case. Even those judges
who felt that the duty of current and former clerks is the same often
commented that negative consequences are likely to be greater if
information about a pending case is disclosed. The potential harms
of such a breach include giving an unfair advantage to one of the
litigants or the others affected by the decision, 140 undermining
public confidence in the judiciary by creating an appearance of
partiality,' 4 ' and interfering with frank deliberations within the
court.
42
134 Possible sanctions under the new ABA disciplinary standards include dis-
bannent, suspension, probation, public reprimand, private admonition, restitution,
and assessment of costs. Id. § 6. For clerks who are not licensed lawyers when a
breach occurs, the breach could be considered when they apply for admission to
the bar.
135 Id. § 7.1.
130 Id. § 1.1.
'37 This guideline is limited by the wrongdoing exception discussed in note
182 infra and text accompanying notes 182-92 infra.
138 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 6, at 721. But cf. Miller & Sastri, supra note
12 (argue that appellate court deliberations should be open to the public).
139All survey respondents agreed that the confidentiality duty extends to
information about pending cases; eighty percent felt this duty also extends to mat-
ters of public record.
140 For example, leaks by a Supreme Court clerk concerning a pending case
were used to speculate on the stock market. P. Barnett, supra note 19, at 1.
141 See text following note 48 supra.
14 2 See notes 39-41 supra & accompanying text.
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Many courts or jurisdictions forbid discussion about pending
cases by court rule143 or by adoption of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct.144 Canon 3A(6) of this Code provides: "A judge should
abstain from public comment about a pending or impending pro-
ceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the
part of court personnel subject to his direction and control." Pre-
sumably, clerks are made aware of this duty. Commonly used law
clerk manuals also make this duty clear.145 Moreover, in view of
the judiciary's strong feelings concerning the impropriety of dis-
closing information about pending cases, most judges probably give
at least an oral instruction to their clerks regarding confidentiality.
The controversial issues concerning pending cases are whether
a clerk should talk freely within the court family, and whether a
clerk should discuss matters that are of public record. Because of
the range of opinions expressed by judges with regard to the first
issue,146 it seems preferable to leave instructions concerning dis-
cussion within the court to the individual judge or court rather
than to articulate a general rule. For example, a sensitive political
climate within an appellate court may mean that discussions be-
tween clerks about their judges would impair the decisionmaking
process or undermine one judge in the view of others in the court
family. In such situations, a judge may wish to limit the clerk's
discussions with other clerks and judges.147  The personal relation-
ship between judge and clerk also favors leaving this decision to the
individual judge. Ideally, however, prohibition of intracourt dis-
cussion will be kept to a minimum in order to enhance the educa-
tional value of a clerkship. 48
Pragmatic arguments favor prohibiting clerks from discussing
matters of public record concerning pending cases; eighty percent
of the survey respondents agreed with such a prohibition. The
reason usually given was the inability of inexperienced clerks to
distinguish adequately what is from what is not part of the public
1 43 See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
144 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra for discussion of applicability of
the Code of Judicial Conduct to law clerks.
145 For example, a handbook used by some federal judges provides that the
"law clerk must resolutely refrain from making any statement, public or private
regarding pending proceedings." A DiLxo & A. RuBiN, supra note 16, at 43.
146 See notes 31-34 supra & accompanying text.
147 Cf. ABA CODE OF PNOFESSIONAL RESPONSmLrY DR 4-101(A) (Attorneys
have a duty to preserve their clients' secrets, including "information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate."). Judges
similarly may wish to keep some "secrets" from their colleagues.
'
4 8 See notes 18-19 supra & accompanying text.
[VoL 129:1230
CONFIDENTIALITY DUTY
record. A blanket prohibition thus would protect against mistakes
in the highly sensitive area of pending litigation. This concern
was articulated by one judge as follows:
It is impossible for a law clerk to separate what he or she
knows from the public record from confidential informa-
tion. Even if the clerk were to confine himself or herself
to the public record it would be perceived to be some-
thing more. Finally, there is no need to inquire of the
law clerk about what is in the public record. That [find-
ing out public information] is not the purpose of the [one
making the] inquiry.149
The very notion of confidentiality, however, embraces matters
that are not generally known. Information of public record, there-
fore, should be excluded from the duty of confidentiality. Any
public record prohibition should remain a prudential rule at the
discretion of each judge or court, rather than a professional con-
duct rule with its attendant sanctions.
B. Past Cases
Guideline: A law clerk should never disclose information concern-
ing the details of decided cases that is not in the public record [for
X years] without permission of the court. This duty continues
after termination of employment.150
After a case has been decided, there no longer exists the poten-
tial danger of unfairness to litigants that is present whenever con-
fidential information about pending cases is disclosed. 15 Disclosing
confidential information about a case after the decision may cause
other harm, however, such as impairment of frank discussion, dam-
14 9 0ne judge who would not require a blanket prohibition nevertheless
sounded a similar cautionary note:
With respect to the duty of confidentiality as to litigated matters, I see
no ground for requiring a law clerk to refrain from reference to matters
which clearly are of "public record"--e.g., the identity of counsel for
plaintiff. But I think a law clerk must be very certain that a particular
datum is, in fact, "of public record." Prudence dictates that any doubt
* * * be resolved in favor of preserving confidentiality.
All of the judges who reported experiencing a breach of confidentiality would pro-
hibit references even to matters of public record. This response, encompassing
one of the few areas in which a notable difference existed between those who had
and those who had not reported a breach, probably is explained by the maxim
"once burned, twice shy."
150This guideline is limited by the wrongdoing exception discussed in text
accompanying notes 182-92 infra.
151 See note 140 supra & accompanying text
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age to the judge-clerk relationship, possible compromise of the ju-
diciary's independence, and threats to the opinion as the sole
rationale of the case. Survey respondents, mentioning these con-
cerns, unanimously extended the clerk's confidentiality duty to
information about past cases, although only about one-half would
prohibit discussion about matters of public record, and some ex-
pressed qualifications concerning the time limit.
The Code of Judicial Conduct and many local court rules
refer specifically to pending cases; 152 they provide little guidance
concerning cases already decided. If a law clerk is defined as a
confidential employee 153 with a professional responsibility anal-
ogous to that of a government lawyer,154 however, the details of
past cases not of public record can be included in a clerk's con-
fidentiality duty. The government lawyer's immediate professional
responsibility is to his or her agency and those charged with its
administration insofar as they are engaged in public business.155
To this extent, the government lawyer's employment relationship
is a confidential one, and his or her professional confidentiality
duty continues after employment terminates. If this reasoning is
applied to the clerk-judge relationship, then information concern-
ing the internal deliberations of decided cases should be kept con-
fidential by current and former clerks, unless it is already part of
the public record.
The fiduciary basis of a law clerk's duty provides support for a
similar conclusion. The clerk's confidentiality duty, based on his
or her position as a trusted employee, 15 would continue after em-
ployment terminates, at least if the duty has been made clear at the
outset.
For these reasons, information concerning the details of de-
cided cases that is not in the public record should be included in a
mandatory professional conduct rule. On the other hand, argu-
ments that the public needs to know about the decisionmaking
15 2 See note 36 supra and text accompanying notes 36 & 143-44 supra. Cf.
D. MAss. B. 36, which arguably includes information about past cases in its pro-
hibitions:
All courthouse personnel, Including among others ... law clerks, are
prohibited from disclosing to any person, without authorization by the
court, information relating to a criminal or civil case that is not of the
public records of the court. The divulgence of information concerning
arguments and hearings held in chambers or otherwise outside the presence
of the public Is also prohibited.
15 3 See notes 100 & 111 supra & accompanying text.
154 See notes 92-95 supra & accompanying text.
155 See note 94 supra & accompanying text.
156 See notes 108-12 supra & accompanying text.
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process 157 become more persuasive once cases are part of history.
Moreover, judges themselves sometimes have revealed the internal
deliberations or compromises involved in past cases, 58 a fact weak-
ening the argument in favor of keeping such information confiden-
tial.159 An appropriate compromise, therefore, would be to allow
law clerks to disclose information about decided cases either with
the judge's permission or after a number of years has passed.1 60
C. General Decisionmaking Practices
Guideline: Information about general internal procedural matters
is not part of a law clerk's confidentiality duty and may be dis-
closed unless the judge specifically prohibits disclosure.
Although eighty-three percent of the survey respondents in-
cluded information about the general decisionmaking practices and
procedures 161 of the judge or court within the scope of a law clerk's
confidentiality duty (twenty-eight percent limited the duty to mat-
ters not of public record), public need for such information strongly
supports permitting disclosure by law clerks. 62 An exception
would be made if the judge or a court rule specifically forbade
such disclosures. The public cannot use the judicial system effec-
tively unless general procedural information is readily available.
16 3
Such information also is needed if the courts are to be open to
informed criticism. 164 The dangers of leaking information about
pending cases or chilling internal discussions are absent in this
context; disclosure would open court procedures and practices to
rational debate, possibly resulting in improved systems. Moreover,
revelations about internal procedures by former clerks are not a
new phenomenon-much of what is known about the role and
'5 7 See notes 61-64 supra & accompanying text
158 See, e.g., W.O. DouCLAs, supra note 1.
159It has been suggested, however, that release of documentation about past
cases is probably the exclusive prerogative of judges. Bender, supra note 6, at 722.
Cf. note 57 & accompanying text (a law clerk's perspective may be limited or
distorted).
160Cf. 44 U.S.C. §§2201-07 (Supp. I1 1979) (ownership and possession of
Presidential records is reserved to the United States; the Archivist of the United
States assumes responsibility for custody and access after a President's term of
office. The President is permitted to limit access to certain types of information
-for example, confidential communications with advisors or national security
matters-for a maximum of twelve years).
161 See question 1(d), Appendix infra.
162 See Morrison, Focusing on the Wrong Secrecy, 66 A.B.A.J. 563 (1980).
163Cf. ABA CODE OF JunarAmI CounucT C oN 3A(6) (permits judges to
explain court procedures).
'0
4 See notes 59-64 supra & accompanying text
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duties of law clerks has been provided in various reminiscences by
clerks.1 65 A substance-procedure distinction is, therefore, a valid
and practical way of resolving the confidentiality issue in this
area.,
1 66
There remains the question of an appropriate forum for law
clerk comments. Ninety-five percent of the survey respondents re-
jected investigative journalism as an appropriate forum because of
suspicions that journalists are interested only in sensationalism and
"gossip or worse," and that journalists' reports are subjective, in-
accurate, and distorted. 167  Similar criticisms have been made by
commentators reviewing The Brethren.1 6  In light of these criti-
cisms, the legal and academic community may provide a more ap-
propriate forum for informed debate about court practices and
procedures. 69 It is inappropriate, however, to prohibit resort to
one forum rather than another because of the clerks' first amend-
ment rights of freedom of expression. Rather, this aspect of a
clerk's confidentiality duty should be left to the individual clerk's
judgment. 170
165 See, e.g., The Bright Young Men Behind the Bench, U. S. NEws & WoaL
RFPoRT, July 12, 1957, at 45 (discusses opinions of Supreme Court Justices, former
Supreme Court clerks, and others about the influence of law clerks).
166 See also Baier, supra note 19, at 1143 n.82.
167 Typical comments include: "If The Brethren is the model of investigative
reporting, it proves the undesirability of this practice. It was not to inform; it
was to impugn without factual basis and denigrate an institution' and "so-called
'investigative journalists' are inherently unreliable, have no ethical standards and
are interested only in scurrilous material, not the truth."
Justice Douglas commented:
[tihe American press . .. is by and large a mimic, not an original
research group. It prints handouts from government and from industry
and expresses its opinion on those items. But the basic facts are seldom
mined; the press does not have the initiative or the zeal to ferret out the
original from the false or pretended.
W.O. DouorLAs, supra note 1, at 206-07.
168 See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 11, at 733 (The Brethren was guided by an
inappropriate muckraking model); Henry, supra note 9, at 495 (the book "has no
historical value or legal significance" and is poorly documented); Kurland, supra
note 10, at 193 ("[nlothing in The Brethren comes close to . . . reasoned criticism
of the Court's work"); Navasky, supra note 55, at 1033 (the book involves "dis-
tortion"). The muckraking and ethical shortcomings of the media also have been
noted by a journalist. See Broder, The Media-Monitors of Virtue?, 55 CH. B.
REc. 19 (1974) (special centennial issue).
169 For example, a recent study of the California courts' practices concerning
the use of law clerks was conducted by interviewing judges and clerks; the results
were presented in the form of composite typical judges, thereby insuring the
anonymity of individual judges. See Oakley & Thompson, supra note 18.
170 In order to avoid jeopardizing pending litigation, judges may wish to
instruct clerks not to speak with the media during their tenure about court-related
matters. See text following note 148 supra.
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D. Philosophies and Traits of Judges
Aspirational Guideline: A law clerk should never disclose informa-
tion concerning a judge's philosophy and personality that is not in
the public record if the judge expressly requests that such informa-
tion remain confidential or if disclosure would be embarrassing to
the judge or to the court.171
The philosophy and personality traits of judges should not be
included in the minimum mandatory content of a clerk's profes-
sional duty, with its attendant sanctions, because of the predomi-
nantly personal nature of the information. An aspirational rule,
on the other hand, proscribing disclosure of information expressly
requested to be kept confidential or that clearly would embarrass
the judge or court, is appropriate.17 2 Such a guideline has the
benefits of clarifying what ideally is expected of law clerks and of
covering those clerks for whom the loyalty basis for the confi-
dentiality duty might be inadequate-for example, central staff
clerks or clerks having irreconcilable personal or philosophical dif-
ferences with their judges.173
Eighty-two percent of the survey respondents felt that the law
clerk's confidentiality duty extends to information about personality
traits and social and political philosophies of judges. A law clerk
handbook used by some federal judges takes a similar view con-
cerning philosophies.174 Judges expressed concern that discussion
would be limited if such disclosures were feared, thereby impairing
the decisionmaking process and the judge-clerk relationship, 75 and
jeopardizing the independent reasoning of the judiciary.17 6 On the
other hand, to the extent that a judge's personality and philosophy
enters the decisionmaking process, particularly in states with elected
judges, the public may be deprived of relevant information by an
internal wall of secrecy.
177
171 This guideline is limited by the wrongdoing exception discussed in text
accompanying notes 182-92 infra.
172Such a rule thus would make ideal for the law clerk what is mandatory
for the private attorney. See note 179 infra.
1
73 See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
174The handbook provides: "The clerk must absolutely forswear all informal
discussions of . . . the judge's views on any particular legal or social issues. If
judges wish to publish their jurisprudential, economic or social views, they know
how to do so." A. DILEo & A. RuiN, supra note 16, at 43.
175 See notes 40-44 supra & accompanying text.
176 See text following note 45 supra. Judges also expressed concern about
"bringing the personality of the judge into an objective decision," fearing that liti-
gants may be apprehensive about the fairness of trials if the judge's philosophy is
publicized.
.
7 7 See notes 61-62 supra & accompanying text. But see note 63 supra
(questioning whether personal factors that enter a decision are ascertainable in
many cases).
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If a law clerk's position is analogous to that of the government
lawyer, 78 the judge is not the clerk's client in the traditional
sense.1'79 Rather, the relationship is confidential only insofar as
judges are engaged in "public business." Judges may be accom-
plishing their public functions when they discuss personal opinions
and philosophies with clerks, but such discussions more often reflect
the personal relationship between judge and clerk.8 0 The loyalty
basis for the confidentiality duty,'8 ' and the consequent reliance on
the clerk's judgment, are thus appropriate enforcement mechanisms
in this area.
E. Wrongdoing Exception
Guideline: A law clerk having knowledge of specific wrongdoing
involving the court may disclose information that otherwise would
be confidential. Such disclosure ordinarily should be made to the
authorities charged with responsibility for disciplinary action against
judges or other court personnel.182
Aspirational Guideline: Suspicion of wrongdoing involving the
court ordinarily is insufficient to justify disclosure of information
within the mandatory scope of the confidentiality duty.
Judges are not "clients" of their clerks; 183 the ethical con-
siderations that normally give rise to the lawyer's confidentiality
-78 See note 92 supra and text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
179 The traditional attorney-client relationship requires that the attorney keep
the client's "confidences" (defined as matters within the attorney-client evidentiary
privilege) and "secrets" (defined to include matters that might be embarrassing or
are designated as secret by the client). ABA CODE OF PnoFEssioNA . REsPoN-
smmiry DR 4-101. Under this model, any information that the judge specifies
should not be revealed or any matters that would be "embarrassing" to the judge
would be included in the clerk's confidentiality duty. Cf. MODEL RuL~s OF No-
FESSIONAL CO NUCT Rule 1.6, supra note 95 (eliminates the "confidences" and
"secrets" notions of an attorney's duty and adopts a coverage of all "information
gained in or relating to representation of the client").
180 Cf. Opinion 73-1, supra note 92, at 72 (the government attorney's profes-
sional responsibility is unlike the private attorney's representation of his or her
client's private interest).
181 See text accompanying notes 74-82 supra.
182 Wrongdoing should include, for example, criminal activity, corruption, and
violations of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.
Compare the attorney's professional responsibility to breach the confidential
relationship with his or her client if necessary to reveal the "intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."
ABA CODE OF PRoFEssioNAL RESPONsiBrrr DR 4-101(C)(3). Some misprision
statutes also override the attorney-client privilege. See Shipman, Professional Re-
sponsibilities of the Corporations Lawyer, in PnoFEssioNAL REsPoNsrarry: A
GumIE FOR ATromxys 271, 228 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (one who conceals
commission of a felony may be fined or imprisoned or both).
18 3 See text accompanying notes 89-95 supra.
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duty,184 therefore, are not present in the clerk-judge relationship. 85
A subpoena to testify, such as the one involved in the California
investigation,18 6 thus would justify disclosure of otherwise confi-
dential matters.8 7  Specific knowledge of wrongdoing also would
justify disclosure, but the first resort should be to the proper au-
thority rather than to the media.'
Many commentators who were critical of law clerk disclosures
to the authors of The Brethren or of clerks testifying publicly in
the California judicial commission investigation indicated they
might feel differently if evidence of specific wrongdoing had been
uncovered. 8 9 The vast majority of survey respondents also felt that
knowledge of specific wrongdoing involving the court or a subpoena
to testify before a judicial commission would justify a breach of
confidentiality by a current or former law clerk. 9 0
1 84 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImLITY EC 4-1. ("Both the
fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning
of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and
secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him.") (footnote omitted).
'85 Concealment of a judge's wrongdoing should not be necessary to maintain-
ing the judge-clerk relationship. Moreover, because the clerk is not personally
representing the private interests of the judge, the possible injury to the relationship
cannot outweigh the benefits gained by disclosure of wrongdoing involving judges
or other court personnel. See note 184 supra.
186 See notes 5 & 7 supra & accompanying text.
187 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-09 (1974) ("The expecta-
tion of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence,
like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the
values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens .... ." But,
interest in criminal justice and the "integrity of the judicial system and public con-
fidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts....").
Whether a judicial investigation is held in public or in private is outside the
clerk's control and should not affect the clerk's duty to testify.
188 Cf. Opinion 73-1, supra note 92, at 73 (government lawyers may disclose
corrupt or illegal conduct to the "'head of the department or agency' . . . who
shall report it to the Attorney General"). The opinion notes that:
disclosure beyond the confines of the agency or other law enforcing or
disciplinary authorities . . . is warranted only in the case when the
lawyer, as a reasonable and prudent man . . . concludes that these au-
thorities have without good cause failed in the performance of their own
obligation to take remedial measures required in the public interest.
Id. 74-75.
Cf. MODEL RuLEs OF PRoFEsSroNAL CONDUCT RULE 1.12, supra note 95
(lawyer representing an organization and knowing of illegal conduct "likely to result
in significant injury to the organization" shall seek to prevent the injury by "refer-
ring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including . ..referral to
the highest authority" before disclosing "information gained in or relating to the
representation of the organization").
1s9 See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 10, at 190; Lewis, supra note 11, at 212;
Tribe, supra note 10, at 1178 (the strong presumption of the confidentiality of a
court's internal deliberations is not absolute).
190 See question 2 of Appendix infra, for wording of the question. Eighty-
four percent of the survey respondents indicated that a subpoena would justify a
breach, although twenty-flve percent would limit the exception to private investi-
gations. Eighty percent believed that knowledge of specific wrongdoing would
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A closer question is whether confidential information should
be disclosed merely on the basis of suspicion of wrongdoing. Only
about one-third of the survey respondents felt suspicion of wrong-
doing would justify disclosure of confidential information. They
emphasized that clerks ordinarily are not sufficiently informed or
experienced to make competent judgments and that ill-founded
suspicion could lead to baseless rumors or damaged reputations. 91
In light of these dangers, drawing the line for disclosure at knowl-
edge, rather than at suspicion, is preferable, although suspicion of
wrongdoing should be included in an aspirational guideline. 92
CONCLUSION
The law clerk's duty to preserve confidentiality has not been
well-defined because of the multifaceted nature of the judge-clerk
relationship, the many arguments for and against preserving con-
fidentiality, and the varying bases for the clerk's duty. Neither the
loyalty of clerks nor the remedies usually provided under con-
tractual or fiduciary theories furnish sufficient assurance that con-
fidential information will be protected.
This Comment has proposed that a set of guidelines be adopted
to govern the law clerk's confidentiality duty, with enforcement
varying according to the type of information involved. Under
these guidelines, the clerk's duty to preserve confidentiality would
extend to information not of public record about pending or past
cases. Clerks would be permitted to discuss general procedural
information; information about judges' philosophies and per-
sonalities not of public record would be left to the personal loyalty
of the clerk and an "aspirational" rule. Knowledge of specific
wrongdoing would be sufficient to justify disclosure of confidential
information, although mere suspicion of wrongdoing would not be
sufficient. The guidelines would be .enforced by disciplinary action
similar to that currently used to enforce the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The proposed guidelines, if adopted, thus
would provide law clerks with a clear, uniform idea of the scope of
their confidentiality duty.
justify a breach, although one-third of these respondents would limit the exception
to private investigations.
191 For discussion about judges' privacy and reputation interests and the dis-
tortions of a law clerk's perspective, see notes 54-57 supra & accompanying text.
192 Cf. Opinion 73-1, supra note 92, at 74 ("With respect to . . . conduct
about which there may be reasonable differences of opinion as to its legality, and
grossly negligent conduct . . . [o]rdinarily there is no need of disclosure of such




In November 1980, the survey questionnaire was mailed to
375 state and federal judges, 111 of whom replied, constituting a
response rate of approximately thirty percent. The sample popula-
tion was defined as judges who use law clerks. In order to obtain
as broad a cross-section of opinion and practice as possible, both
federal and state judges at all three levels of courts were included
in the sample. All United States Supreme Court Justices and
courts of appeals judges were included, and a one-in-five sample
of district court judges was taken. Five appellate judges from
each of twenty-five states 1 were included. Because of the difficulty
ascertaining whether particular state trial court judges employed
law clerks, only a small sample of these judges was taken.
Although a thirty percent response rate compares favorably
with the response rate of many postal questionnaire surveys,2 the
response rate was not high enough to warrant statistical statements,3
and the percentage results presented in the Comment should not
be so read. Nevertheless, a number of factors extrinsic to the re-
sponse rate suggest at least some validity to the results. The threat
of bias in the results stems largely from the possibility that re-
spondents and nonrespondents form different populations that vary
significantly on the questions asked.4 Although judges with stronger
opinions on the issue of law clerk confidentiality probably were
more likely to respond,5 responses were received from all levels of
the state and federal court systems, and a wide range of opinions
and practices was reported. Moreover, the unanimity or near
unanimity of the responses to some questions suggests at least a
sizeable group consensus on certain issues.6 More caution should
be exercised in interpreting the lower percentage results; neverthe-
less, even these findings suggest a split of opinion within the
judiciary.
I States were selected alphabetically, every other one.
2 See M. PAnTEN, SURVEYS, PoLLs, ArD SAmPwLEs: PRACTiCAL PRocEDuREs
391-96 (1966).
3 See C. MosER & G. KALTON, Sx.VE:Y METHODS 3n SocL INvESTIGATION
166-67 & 268 (2d ed. 1972).
4 See id. 167-69.
iSee id. 268; M. PAnTm, supra note 2, at 391-92.
6 See questions 1(a)-(b) & 2(c) of the questionnaire, infra.
1981] 12.63
1264 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
QUESTIONNAIRE
1. IN YOUR VIEW, DOES A LAW CLERK'S DUTY TO MAINTAIN CON-
FIDENTIALITY EXTEND TO INFORMATION ABOUT:
(a) pending or impending cases?
(please tick as appropriate)
(b) past cases?
80% Yes






(c) any conversation with a judge
regardless of topic?
(d) general decisionmaking
practices of court or judge?





















Please describe your reasons for each of the above answers.
2. WOULD ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY A
CURRENT OR FORMER LAW CLERK'S REVEALING CONFIDENTIAL
MATERIAL?
(a) knowledge of specific wrong-
doing involving the court?
suspicion of wrongdoing
involving the court?
Why or why not?
(b) a subpoena to testify before a
judicial commission
investigation?














Why or why not?
(d) historical or other scholarly
research?
Why or why not?
5% Yes 95% No
26% Yes 74% No
3. DOES A CURRENT LAW CLERK HAVE A GREATER
FiDENTIALITY THAN A FORMER CLERK?
DUTY OF CON-
30% Yes 70% No
Why or why not?
4. FROM WHAT BASIS DOES THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY DERIVE
IN YOUR VIEW?
(a) 51% code of professional responsibility (b) 20% court rules
(c) 3% statute (d) 22% contract (e) 63% fiduciary duty
(f) 31% other (please specify).
5. Do You (OR DoES YOUR COURT) USE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING
PROCEDURES/PRACTICES CONCERNING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
YOUR LAW CLERKS:
(a) oral instructions
(b) guidelines in manual for
law clerks
(c) oath promising confidentiality
(d) written agreement promising
confidentiality
(e) local court rules












If "Yes" to any of the above, please describe content and (where
relevant) enclose a copy with your reply.
6. HAVE You OR OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR COURT EXPERIENCED
ANY INCIDENTS YOU CONSIDER TO BE BREACHES OF CONFIDENTI-
ALITY BY LAW CLERKS?
18% Yes .... No
If "Yes," please describe the nature of the incident(s) and con-
sequences (e.g. greater security measures, sanctions imposed,
etc.).
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7. How MIGHT (OR DID) A BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY BY A
LAW CLERK AFFECT YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER CLERKS,
E.G., WOULD (OR DID) IT AFFECT THE RANGE/TYPE OF Discus-
SION OR YOUR PREFERENCE FOR HIRING ONLY PERMANENT
CLERKs?
8. PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS You MAY HAVE FOR
A SYSTEMATIC POLICY AND/OR ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM CON-
CERNING LAW CLERK CONFIDENTIALITY.
